The Briantie Group, centered around Cyprus entity Briantie Limited and Curaçao‑licensed Wiraon B.V., illustrates a high‑risk model in which offshore casino operators leverage EU‑based payment agents and opaque crypto processors to target players in prohibited markets such as Italy. The group’s structure, domain practices, and payment setup raise significant regulatory and AML/CTF red flags.
Briantie Limited is a Cyprus‑registered private limited company that appears to act as an EU‑based payment and operational agent for Verde Casino and related brands, while core gambling licensing is outsourced to Curaçao entity Wiraon B.V. (license 8048/JAZ). Together, these entities form what can be described as the Briantie Group, combining EU and offshore components to distribute regulatory and enforcement risk.
In this model, Curaçao provides the nominal gambling licence and hosting structure, while Cyprus offers access to SEPA banking, EU payment institutions, and a veneer of single‑market proximity to target European players, including those in restricted jurisdictions.
In the FinTelegram Verde Casino review, we identified the use of mutated and parameter‑stuffed URLs such as https://85verdecasino.com/it-it#https://85verdecasino.com/it-it# that are clearly tailored to Italian‑language users. This points to deliberate geo‑targeting of players in Italy, a jurisdiction where unlicensed online casinos are prohibited and subject to enforcement.
The use of such mutated domains is a classic circumvention tactic: by deploying multiple, often short‑lived domains and URL variants, operators can evade blacklists, dilute brand traceability, and obfuscate the technical footprint of their illegal offerings.
Our Verde Casino review also revealed a broad range of crypto payment options routed through third‑party gateways, including the anonymous operator TheDex (thedex.cloud). TheDex presents itself as a crypto exchange or payment gateway but provides minimal, if any, corporate, licensing, or ownership transparency. The cyber rating agency RatEx42 has already black-listed TheDex over its facilitation of illegal casinos.
We again identified the involvement of the Polish provider ChainValley, which appears to facilitate synthetic FIAT deposits: customer bank transfers are first used to purchase cryptocurrencies, which are then automatically routed by ChainValley to the casino operator as the ultimate beneficiary.
From a compliance perspective, this combination of offshore casino operations, EU‑based payment agents, and unlicensed or opaque crypto gateways embedded in the EU payments ecosystem is highly problematic. It undermines customer due diligence, source‑of‑funds scrutiny, and effective transaction monitoring, and it increases exposure to money laundering and sanctions risks.
Skrill classifies Briantie Limited as a non‑eligible merchant for its promotional programmes, as evidenced by its inclusion in Skrill’s ‘Non Eligible Skrill Merchants’ list. This classification indicates that established payment service providers actively distinguish and ring‑fence higher‑risk merchants, including operators associated with offshore online gambling, from standard customer reward and incentive schemes.”
Briantie Limited and its associated licensee Wiraon B.V., together with the Verde Casino brand, have been flagged on regulatory watchlists and technical blocklists in multiple jurisdictions, underscoring their status as illegal gambling operators. In particular, the ‘Lithuania Illegal Gambling Operators’ dataset maintained within the OpenSanctions framework lists Briantie Limited among unlicensed providers whose services are deemed unlawful in that jurisdiction.
In Italy, the main Verde Casino domain is subject to administrative blocking measures by the Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli (ADM), which orders ISPs to prevent access to unlicensed gambling sites and routinely updates a national blacklist of prohibited domains.
These measures demonstrate that competent authorities are not only aware of the Briantie/Verde setup but have already taken concrete steps—through sanctions-style listings, public blacklists, and technical blocking orders—to restrict its availability and to signal elevated legal and regulatory risk for both players and intermediaries.
Our findings:
Overall, the Briantie Group exemplifies how illegal casino operators can operate “under the nose” of regulators by fragmenting their operations across offshore entities, EU‑based payment agents, and lightly regulated crypto intermediaries.
| Element | Details |
|---|---|
| Brands (casinos) | Verde Casino (core brand identified in our review; other white‑label or sister brands possible). |
| Domains | 85verdecasino.com and mutated/parameterized variants targeting Italy (e.g., /it-it#…). |
| Legal entities | Briantie Limited (Cyprus, payment/operational agent); Wiraon B.V. (Curaçao, gambling licence holder). |
| Individuals | Ultimate beneficial owners and controlling persons not transparently disclosed; further mapping required. |
| Regulatory frameworks | Curaçao online gambling regime; Cypriot/EU financial and corporate law; national gambling laws in target markets (e.g., Italy). |
| Jurisdictions | Operational and licensing nexus: Curaçao; payment and corporate nexus: Cyprus/EU; targeted player markets: Italy and other EU/third‑country jurisdictions. |
| Payment stack | Traditional card/fiat channels plus crypto payment gateways, including the opaque TheDex (thedex.cloud) and Polish on-ramper ChainValley. |
We invite affected players, payment industry insiders, and former or current staff of Briantie, Verde Casino, TheDex, or connected intermediaries to share documents, experiences, or technical evidence with us confidentially via our whistleblower platform Whistle42.

